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STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel. The trial court's findings of fact 
regarding whether the right to counsel is knowingly and intelligently 
waived will not overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. State 
v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991). However, the trial court's determination of whether the 
right to counsel is knowingly and intelligently waived is reviewed 
for correction of error. See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); Cf. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940-41 (Utah 1994) (whether a defendant 
validly waived his or her Miranda rights is a question of law 
reviewed for correct of error); State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 
518 (Utah App. 1992) (trial court's interpretation of binding case 
law presents question of law that is reviewed for correctness); State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270-71 & n.ll (Utah 1993) (trial court's 
determination of whether consent to search is voluntary is question 
of law that is reviewed for correction of error); State v. Mabe, 864 
P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1993) (ultimate legal determination of whether a 
confession is voluntary is conclusion of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness). Furthermore, whether the trial court utilized the 
proper legal standard in reaching its determination as to a waiver is 
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reviewed for correction of error. id. ("in assessing the trial 
court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings, we afford it 
no deference but apply a 'correction of error standard'"); State v. 
Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah App.), rev'd in part and aff'd in 
part, 862 P.2d 1354 (1993); State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 
(Utah 1993) . In such a case, the defendant bears the burden of proof 
on appeal to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
did not appropriately waive his right to counsel. State v. Frampton, 
737 p.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987); State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 
(Utah 1986); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 1991). 
This issue was not raised before the trial court. In reviewing 
Utah case law on the issue of waiver, counsel was unable to locate 
any case discussing the waiver of the right to counsel in the context 
of the well-established requirement that the issue must first be 
raised before the trial court. However, in an abundance of caution, 
counsel includes as part of the instant appeal, for the reasons 
stated below, how this appeal presents exceptional circumstances 
and/or circumstances constituting plain error. See State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987), on subsequent appeal, 779 P.2d 1133 
(Utah 1989). 
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2. Whether Defendant's right to self-representation was 
violated by the trial court's appointment of trial counsel as standby 
counsel notwithstanding the obvious conflict of interest between 
trial counsel and Defendant or by the trial court's failure to 
address the conflict of interest issue. Similar to the review of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the issue is a mixed 
question of law and fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984). Because there are no findings of 
fact in the instant case as to this issue, the matter of whether 
there was a conflict of interest or a waiver of such is a question of 
law, which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 
484, 487 (Utah App. 1991) . The plain error and/or exceptional 
circumstances review is cited above and below in Argument I. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Utah Const. art. I, § 12 
See case law cited above 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
7 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By information, Defendants Dwayne Johnson, Perry McDonald, and 
Kal Johnson, were charged with Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 and 76-3-203.1. 
After continuances and delay due to transfer to another judge, 
Defendant, on June 17, 1993, appeared with appointed counsel, William 
J. Albright, for Preliminary Hearing before the Honorable Alfred C. 
Van Wagenen, Second Circuit Court, after which Defendant was bound 
over to the district court. 
On June 29, 1993, Defendant appeared before the district court 
for arraignment, during which Defendant pleaded not guilty. 
Thereafter, on July 20, 1993, Defendant appeared with appointed 
trial counsel, William J. Albright, for Pretrial Hearing before the 
district court. On August 4, 1993, Defendant appeared with appointed 
trial counsel for jury trial. After jury selection, Defendant's 
appointed trial counsel requested an in-chambers conference, during 
which Defendant expressed that trial counsel was unprepared for 
trial. The trial court informed Defendant of his right to act as his 
own attorney. After a brief colloquy, the trial court determined 
that Defendant could act as his own attorney at trial, and that 
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appointed trial counsel would act as stand-by counsel at trial. 
Following the jury trial, Defendants and his co-defendant, Dwayne 
Johnson, were convicted of Aggravated Robbery. 
On August 31, 1993, the trial court sentenced Defendant to five 
years to life at the Utah State Prison and a fine of $10,000. 
Defendant, through trial counsel, filed Notice of Appeal on September 
16, 1993. The trial court signed the Sentence on August 31, 1993, 
which was filed on September 22, 1993. On October 18, 1993, the 
trial court signed the Judgment, which was filed that same day. 
Thereafter, on January 25, 1994, appellate counsel entered an 
appearance as new counsel on appeal. On August 18, 1994, Defendant 
through new appellate counsel, filed his Rule 23B Motion and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Rule 23B Motion 
and the Affidavit of Perry McDonald in Support of Rule 23B Motion. 
The Utah Court of Appeals granted Defendant's Rule 23B Motion by way 
of Order on September 16, 1994, temporarily remanding the case to the 
trial court "for the limited purpose of entry of findings of fact on 
appellant's claims that former counsel's pre-trial actions 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel." 
On January 24, 1995, counsel appeared before the trial court for 
a status hearing, where the trial court set the Rule 23B evidentiary 
hearing for March 8, 1995. The trial court, on March 8, 1995, heard 
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evidence pertaining to Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, after which it took the matter under advisement. 
The trial court, on April 28, 1995, signed its Findings of Fact 
pursuant to the Rule 23B evidentiary hearing, which was entered on 
that same day. The record and transcript of the Rule 23B remand 
proceedings were transmitted to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
inclusion as part of the record on appeal. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
1. On May 9, 1993, at approximately 11:40 p.m., two 
individuals, each having a firearm, entered the Arctic Circle in 
Clearfield, Utah, and took money from the business, as well as other 
items of personal property from employees of the business (R. 14-15, 
Information; R. 128-179, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume I)); 
2. At the Pretrial, on July 20, 1993, Defendant appeared with 
appointed trial counsel, William J. Albright (R. 50, Transcript of 
Pretrial Hearing). After appointed trial counsel represented to the 
trial court that there would only be one witness called on 
Defendant's behalf, the following exchange between Defendant and the 
court took place: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Mr. McDonald had a question for the 
Court. 
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THE COURT: Yes. 
MR, McDONALD: Yes. I would like to know what kind of 
law am I standing in. Is this a constitutional right 
or what is this, just a Maritime law or what? 
THE COURT: It has nothing to do with Maritime laws. 
You are under the laws of the State of Utah which are 
statute in nature and guaranteed by both the 
Constitution of this State and the United States. 
MR. McDONALD: All right. 
(R. 55-56, Transcript of Pretrial Hearing); 
3. On August 4, 1993, Defendant appeared with appointed trial 
counsel, William J. Albright, for jury trial (R. 29, Minute Entry; R. 
62, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume I)); 
4. Following jury selection, Defendant requested to speak with 
the trial court (R. 93, lines 18-19, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume 
I) ) . During the in-chambers conference, the following discussion 
took place: 
MR. MURPHY: Mr. McDonald has asked to talk to you, 
Judge [sic] 
THE COURT: We are in chambers in the matter of State 
of Utah vs. Perry McDonald. The defendant is present, 
along with Mr. Albright and Carvel Harward from the 
Davis County Attorney's Office. Mr. McDonald? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, your Honor. I don't feel that I 
am being properly counseled or as a lawyer being, you 
know, as far as discussing the matter, because for a 
fact number one, he did not get in touch with me any 
time during the week to even discuss or go over 
things. He just, you know, like I come to court now, 
just to go to trial, then he comes and says this and 
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that, but we did not go over no battle plans or any 
such thing. 
Then, two, the DA brings in coats and jackets 
that he did not prevail doing in my preliminary 
hearing, and that I am not getting proper counseling. 
My lawyer did not go over any kind of battle plans or 
get me prepared for this. He was going to make me a 
bargain, which I did not -- I didn't want to take it. 
So he did not come and discuss no common battle plans 
to me. I am not prepared. I really think he is not 
prepared to go on in this case right now. 
THE COURT: Mr. Albright. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Your Honor, I take a position opposite 
to that, and that puts me in an awkward situation, 
because I am here to represent him. 
THE COURT: You need to represent what your efforts 
have been. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Okay. I have been to the jail at least 
three times to visit him and discuss the case. I 
provided him with all the police reports, all 
preliminary hearing transcripts, and I have reviewed 
all of that material with him. I have taken at least 
eights phone calls collect from him at my own expense, 
paid for those phone calls. I have had at least a 
half dozen phone calls from relatives. I have had — 
and I have been happy to talk to all his relatives 
regarding the case, and they have relayed messages to 
me from him when they felt that it was appropriate. 
We discussed the plea bargain about three or four days 
beforehand with a jail visit. He informed me he was 
going to take the plea. I talked to him before we 
went into court and I sat down and we discussed the 
plea bargain about three or four days beforehand with 
a jail visit. He informed me he was going to take the 
plea. I talked to him before we went into court and 
I sat down and we reviewed all the evidence one more 
time and he, at that time, told me he would take the 
plea. When we went into court he changed his mind, 
which is his right, and decided at that time that he 
would go to trial. 
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I am prepared at this time, because of our 
previous --my previous jail visits, previously going 
over the preliminary hearing transcript and all of the 
police reports, which also I did do, I did personally 
do the preliminary hearing, so I have seen the 
evidence. I met with Mr. Harward numerous times on 
this. In fact, he has provided me with full access to 
his file, which he has had an open file. I have been 
to his office at least three times and reviewed the 
complete file, and I have had probably three or four 
conversations, two of which I have sat down and in Mr. 
Harward's office to review the evidence that he would 
be presenting. In fact, I think it was two days ago 
that Mr. Harward and myself reviewed completely his 
case in chief, and I also at that time discussed with 
him what my plan was of the evidence that I would 
present during the trial and my theory of the case. 
So we have -- my relationship with the prosecutor's 
office has been full disclosure and I have been 
prepared on this matter as of last week. 
THE COURT: Mr. McDonald? 
MR. McDONALD: Just like he said, he has been 
prepared, but he hasn't prepared me. I am the one 
that is going to have to go up and do a five to life. 
THE COURT: I don't know what more preparation you 
would make, Mr. McDonald. Are you going to testify? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Well, then, you have a right to go over 
that and there is plenty of time to do that [sic] 
MR. McDONALD: Do I have the right to go question, 
myself, the people that he puts on the stand? 
THE COURT: You can act as your own attorney if you 
want to. 
MR. McDONALD: Okay [sic] 
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MR. ALBRIGHT: I would be happy to sit there and 
advise him throughout the trial, your Honor, if he 
prefers to represent himself. 
T H E COURT: Do you prefer to represent yourself? 
MR. MCDONALD: Tr-s, sir. 
THE COURT: I « ~t-„w yc u to do that and make your 
questioning. You need to understand, however, that 
you will be required to abide by the same rules of 
evidence as any attorney would be. Have you. been to 
court before? 
™v • JICDONALD : Y es , 
THE COURT: How many rimes nave you been : 
before? H v - <- • ---- ..h^^^u > — ^ ? 
MR. MCDONALD: : have se-.r. t : ;al before, yes, I 
have. 
THE fX)!JPT" N f • | ^-M '-I.'.'M* ' " \ " "ii involved in o n e ? 
in HI MCDONALD : i'" 
*„± U'JUKI': Have you been there wl len questions were 
a ---i «• ; responses were given? 
cDONALDi Yes, your Honor. 
T H E C O U R T : I U U I J . J . « - ouiii*-..- k i n i^ 1 < -I ' -K t l i e i I M I P S 
of evidence? 
'MR. MCDONALD • " - - ~-r 
THE COU- ; .'.-s required in that 
regard? 
MR. MCDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT; 'I'CU realize chat this is a serious case 
and that the evidence that would be presented is going 
to be critical in this matter? 
3 4 
MR, MCDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Knowing that, is it still your desire to 
proceed and act as your own attorney? 
MR. MCDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: How much education have you had, Mr. 
McDonald? 
MR. McDONALD: I graduated, your Honor. 
THE COURT: From what? 
MR. McDONALD: From high school. 
THE COURT: Have you had any college experience? 
MR. McDONALD: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you read, write and understand the 
English language? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you appear to be very articulate, is 
that true? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Well, you have a right to act as your own 
attorney, but I will ask Mr. Albright to be here. 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, I would like for him to be there. 
THE COURT: Would you like him to make your opening 
argument for you? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. You can proceed and I will ask you 
to -- you may ask questions or may ask him to ask them for 
you, however you feel most comfortable. 
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MR. MCDONALD: _ ^ 
" ^ COURT: But he will remain there and be there to assist 
MR, MC^ONAI. • .^  
(RB 93_99r jury Trial Transcript (Volume I)) Thereafter, Defendant 
changed his mind and chose not to have Mr. Al^n^nt give the opening 
argument ] 20, -T'lry Trial Transcript (Volume I)); 
5 Notwithstanding the tact. -'"u Defendant initially appeared 
at i.:j '_ : . J . •
 : . . . •• . . .-•- ^ r * - - ^
r
 *--* 
day of trial the trial court determined that Defendant could 
represent himself at tr^.. ; t.ie t_ ci^-i ) 
wh-'-h^-'- ir e of continuance might be necessary for Defendant, pro 
se, to adequately prepare for the jury trial; 
6. Defender' • -r '.. -. - ;-:-- with co-defendant, Dwayne 
Johnson, who was represented r:y appointed trial counsel, Michael 
Murphy L- ", H I nut • MIH J / i " I int" i i i M M IV i =I 1 
Transcript (Volume I ) ) ; 
7 . Du ring the j u r y t r i a 1, t he p i: c s e c u t :i : i I s • :: a s e i i i :: 1 i i e f 
consumed one full day, during which ^he prosecution called twelve 
witnesses and offered over twenty exhiLic. . 410, Transcript of 
Ji i! y T V i r\ 1 l '  ri •>! unit - | ,i i ; 
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8. At one point during that first day of the jury trial, after 
a lengthy discussion between the trial court and counsel concerning 
side bar conferences and whether or not proper Miranda warnings had 
been administered by the police in the instant case, Defendant 
interjected with the following comment: "Your Honor, I don't know 
really about what all of these big words is going on, but the last 
officer he did not read me my Miranda rights at all. He just went 
right into questions." (R. 308, lines 18-21, Jury Trial Transcript 
(Volume I) ) ; 
9. On the second day of the jury trial, while Defendant 
presented his case-in-chief and attempted to refer to the police 
report, the following exchange took place: 
MR. McDONALD: I would like to show this paper, this 
police report to the jury. 
THE COURT: It's not offered, you can't show it to 
them, Mr. McDonald. 
MR. McDONALD: I would like to refer to the police 
report. Can I? 
THE COURT: You cannot refer to the police report 
unless you do it through the witness who wrote it. 
MR. McDONALD: Is that witness here? 
THE COURT: I don't know who wrote it. 
MR. McDONALD: It says Clearfield Police Department. 
THE COURT: That doesn't tell you who wrote it, which 
of the officers wrote it. At any rate, you can't use 
17 
it with this witness. You've got to use it with some 
other witness. 
1 II !  1 1 .DONA 1 .i: 1 1 ] i ght 
(R . 4 0 0 - 4 01, Jury Tr i a 1 Transcript (Vo lume II)) . The re a f t e r, 
Def endai it • id :I i I : t attei i: ip 1: . _ .
 r . • ;...-„._. 
no indication in the record that standby counsel attempted to assist 
Defendant in referring to the police report as evidence; 
MI The -y ciiai cranscripts are completely devoid of any 
indication that former appointed trial counsel, who was also standby 
u , . ,.-,e] du:: . • ' E; ji 1:1 : y t::i : :i a ] , EELS si , 3 ted Defendant :ii n :i ng the course 
of the jury trial ;R. ':C-500, Jury Trial Transcript (Volumes I and 
II) ) I l L.-. . ..*..•_, ~_ ,, - ,. . , ght. as • 
standby counsel., askeri ----«- 'IP be excused inasmuch as he felt that 
Defendant would not need 1 sgal advice for Closing Arguments (R 162, 
J . • ""- : i" fTM;anscricr Volume II) ) ; 
11. After the jury trial, Defendant and his co-defendant were 
con .:;•_-- i. : " ' -^  = "* * ' 
12. Or. August 31, 1993, Defendant was sentenced, t ~- rive years 
to life at tl: u i IJtal: i Si .at .< E: 3= i isoi l • EH i i f I .€ : i $1 0 000 (1 1 3 ; Se nl : .< a :L ze , • 
R. 42-43, Judgment). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court, among other things, failed to adequately 
advise Defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. As a result, Defendant did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel. By failing to adequately determine whether 
there was a valid waiver, the trial court failed in its duty to 
determine if the waiver is a voluntary one which is knowingly and 
intelligently made. In the course of the exchange as to self-
representation, the trial court erred by focusing almost exclusively 
on Defendant's background, and thereby utilized the wrong standard 
for determining whether Defendant validly waived the right to 
assistance of counsel. 
2. The trial court, by appointing former trial counsel as 
standby counsel to assist Defendant in his self-representation, 
failed to preserve Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation and violation Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
self-representation. Reversal is required by the trial court's 
failure to address the conflict of interest issue inasmuch as it knew 
or should have reasonably known about the conflict of interest 
situation. 
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ARGUMENTS 
i-na iKiAL COURT, BASED ON" THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
BEFORE IT, ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT DEFENDANT 
KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.. 
"T h e r i g 1 11: t •• : • :i : e p r e s e n t: :> n e s e 1 f :i i i a • :: i :i i i i :i i i a ] p r o c e e d i n g :i s ;  \ e ] 1 
established. In Faretta ;  ! , California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 
(197 5) , the Unite' I States Supr erne C :>i i i I : .• : -t- = I til: lat t!l: le S:i : ctl i 
Amendment to the United States Constitution,1 which gives criminal 
defendants the means to put on a defense, _;;p^iea^y guarantees the 
ric .,^&-^ >. acci lsed to represent himself, without counsel, 
in criminal proceedings. Id. a: 818-1?, ~" S.~t. at 2533; see also 
Stct.'. ' l 
right zc conduce his cwn defense "must he respected and guarded by 
the courts in harmony wi th the righ t t :> as si s tai ice : -f • :: -ounsel a I so 
guaranteed by the sixth amendment." Frampton, " 73 7 P. 2d at 187 
(emphasis added). ml~~ ~-~v,*. +-0 represent onese^i _n a criminal 
proceeding - TV-^* i i v the Utah Constitution and other Utah 
law. State ' Bakalov, b~ J r;. 2d G2^, 632-33 (Utah App ) rev'd in 
£ di i_ . • " ' 732 
P.2d 505, 50"7 [Utah 1386'; State v. Rupie, 631 ?.2d -3 -, -'- lUtah 
1981) ; State . ..minguez. - . • : . ; 
:1The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy thp right to 
. have the Assistance of counsel for his defence." 
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Wilson, 563 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Utah 1977); State v. Penderville, 2 
Utah 2d 281, 288, 272 P.2d 195, 199 (1954); Utah Const, art. I, § 12;2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)(a).3 
The right to assistance of counsel "is personal in nature and 
may be waived by a competent accused if the waiver is ^knowingly and 
intelligently' made." Frampton, 737 P. 2d at 187; see also 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 (1972); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938); 
Ruple, 631 P.2d at 875-76; Wilson, 563 P.2d at 793-94. Because the 
accused's decision to defend himself is a waiver of the right to 
assistance of counsel, the trial court has a "duty to determine if 
the waiver is a voluntary one which is knowingly and intelligently 
made." Frampton, 737 P.2d 187; see also State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 
724, 731 (Utah App. 1991) (stating that "trial courts have an 
affirmative duty to determine that a defendant who chooses self-
representation does so knowingly and intelligently"). A knowing and 
intelligent waiver is required because " [w] hen an accused manages his 
own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the 
2Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel . . . ." 
3Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a) provides: "In criminal 
prosecutions the defendant is entitled: To appear in person and 
defend in person or by counsel." 
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traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel Faretta, 
422 U.S. at 3^5, 95 S. Ct. at 254] In making this determination or 
waiver, the accused u should be made aware of the dangers and 
disadvantages < of self-representation, so that the record w:_ 
establish tint "HP tin.vw; win' 1|" " -' ^^^^>i -^ i his choice is made with 
eyes open, Faretta, 422 U.3 ar Sit, * .- . Ct. at 2541 (quoting 
Adams v. [ i hi ted Stales ex i 
236, 241 (1942) (emphasis added,, . Ordinarily, the information for 
determining an appropriate waives "can only he elicited alter 
rp:'-ur-^ :r.": questioning by the trial court. Frampton, 737 P.2d at 
187 .'rierefore, i -olloquy on the record, between the court and the 
a _.. . o - ------ v
 r e d me t h od • : • f a s c e i !:  a i n i i lg !:  1: le r a 1 :i • i i t A, r o i a 
waiver because it insures that defendants understand the risks of 
self-representarr: .i-:. -• . .• 
which appeals may be limited. __:. ^s a auide for ascertaining a 
valid waiver, the Utah Supreme Court, in Frampton, quotea irom the 
E^" ,:- ~ '•'. : jr United States District Court Judges, vol. 1 §§ 1.02-2 
to ~r5 ! Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 1986), which provides: 
An accused has a constitutional right to 
represent himself if he chooses to do so A. 
defendant's waiver of counsel must, however, be 
knowing and voluntary. This means that you must 
make clear on the record that the defendant is 
fully aware of the hazards that he faces and the 
disadvantages of self-representation. 
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When a defendant states that he wishes to 
represent himself, you should therefore ask 
questions similar to the following: 
(a) Have you ever studied law? 
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or 
any other defendant in a criminal action? 
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are 
charged with these crimes: (Here state the 
crimes with which the defendant is 
charged.) 
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you 
are found guilty of the crime charged in 
Count I, the court . . . could sentence you 
to as much as years in prison and fine 
you as much as $ ? (Then ask him 
similar questions with respect to each 
other crime with which he may be charged in 
the indictment or information.) 
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you 
are found guilty of more than one of those 
crimes this court can order that the 
sentences be served consecutively, that is, 
one after another? 
(f) You realize, do you not, that if you 
represent yourself, you are on your own? I 
cannot tell you how you should try your 
case or even advise you as to how to try 
your case. 
(g) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules 
of Evidence 
(h) Your realize, do you not, that the . . 
. Rules of Evidence govern what evidence 
may or may not be introduced at trial and, 
in representing yourself, you must abide by 
those rules? 
(i) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules 
of Criminal Procedure? 
(j) You realize, do you not, that those 
rules govern the way in which a criminal 
action is tried in . . . court? 
(k) You realize, do you not, that if you 
decide to take the witness stand, you must 
present your testimony by asking questions 
of yourself? You cannot just take the 
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stand and tell your story. You must 
proceed question by question through your 
testimony 
(1) (Then say to the defendant something 
to this effect) • I must advise you that in 
my opinion you would be far better defended 
by a trained lawyer than you can be by 
yourself. I think it is unwise of you to 
try to represent yourself You are not 
familiar with the law .ot 
familiar with court procedure. You are not 
familiar with the Rules of Evidence. I 
would strongly urge you not to try to 
represent yourself. 
(m) Now, :i n light of the penalty that yG'U 
might suffer if you are found guilty and in 
light of all the difficulties of 
representing yourself, is it still your 
desire to represent yourself and to give up 
your right to be represented by a lawyer? 
(n) Is your decision entirely voluntary on 
your part? 
(o) If the answers to the two preceding 
questions are in the affirmative, you 
should then say something to the following 
effect; "I find that the defendant has 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right 
to counsel. I will therefore permit him to 
represent himself." 
(p) You should consider the appointment of 
standby counsel to assist the defendant and 
to replace him if the court should 
determine during trial that the defendant 
can no longer be permitted to represent 
himself. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12. While the aforementioned sixteen 
points are not mandatory, the Utah Supreme Court suggested that they 
pre ^  n de a i KE; = fi il framework to insure that there is a voluntary, 
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knowing, and intelligent waiver of the fundamental constitutional 
right to the assistance of counsel. Drobel, 815 P.2d at 732 n.14. 
Absent such a colloquy, the appellate court will look at any 
evidence in the record that shows a defendant's actual awareness of 
the risks of proceeding pro se. Id. at 188. "[W]hether a knowing 
and intelligent waiver has been made turns upon the particular facts 
and circumstances surrounding each case." Id. 
While a defendant's background is relevant to his ability to 
waive his right to counsel, a defendant's background 
is not relevant to show whether a sensible, 
literate, and intelligent defendant possesses 
the necessary information to make a meaningful 
decision as to waiver of counsel. The fact that 
a defendant is well educated, can read, or has 
been on trial previously is not dispositive as 
to whether he understood the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of self-representation in a 
particular situation. 
In the absence of a colloquy, the record 
must somehow otherwise show that the defendant 
understood the seriousness of the charges and 
knew the possible maximum penalty. The record 
should also show that the defendant was aware of 
the existence of technical rules and that 
presenting a defense is not just a matter of 
telling one's story. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188 (quoting City of Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 
Wash.2d 203, 211, 691 P.2d 957, 962 (1984) (en banc)). 
The issue of whether there was a valid waiver is raised for the 
first time on appeal. Although there are no cases discussing the 
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failure to raise the waiver issue to the trial court, ordinarily, the 
failure to raise an issue before the trial court precludes 
consideration of the issue on appeal. State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 
566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). There are, however, two limited but well-
established exceptions to this general rule. State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). The appellate court may address 
an issue for the first time on appeal if the trial court committed 
plain error or there are exceptional circumstances. Id. 
In State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 
814, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the 
following principles involved in determining whether "plain error" 
exists: 
The first requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from 
our examination of the record, we must be able 
to say that it should have been obvious to a 
trial court that it was committing error . . . . 
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement 
for a finding of plain error is that the error 
affect the substantial rights of the accused, 
i.e., that the error be harmful. 
Id. at 35. According to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 
1989) , "in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' [found 
in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the 'plain error' 
standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and 
elaborated upon in Eldredge . . . ." 
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The second exception is the catch-all device requiring 
''exceptional'' or unusual" circumstances. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d at 
923. This exception acts as a safety device "to make certain that 
manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an 
issue on appeal." Id. 
As to the plain error exception in the instant case, the trial 
court committed plain error in the course of its colloquy about the 
waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel by the obvious 
failure to comply with the requirements of the standards set forth in 
Faretta and Frampton. 
Based on the inadequate colloquy between the trial court and 
Defendant, which evidences numerous failures to comply with the 
constitutional and procedural requirements of determining a valid 
waiver, it should have been obvious to the trial court that it was 
committing error. See Frampton, 837 P. 2d at 187 & n.12; Ruple, 631 
P. 2d at 876. That such an error was plain or obvious is supported by 
case law, which holds that "it is the trial court's duty to determine 
if this waiver is a voluntary one which is knowingly and 
intelligently made." Frampton, 837 P. 2d at 187. Secondly, the 
failure of the trial court to comply with the standards of 
determining a valid waiver affected the substantial rights of 
Defendant by failing to insure that Defendant waived his right to the 
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assistance of counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently prior 
to waiving the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. 
In addition to the "plain error" exception, the instant case 
presents exceptional or unusual circumstances. Defendant, for all 
intents and purposes, was not represented by counsel during the in-
chambers conference when the exchange as to waiver took place. 
Consequently, Defendant, who was pro se litigant, was extremely 
unfamiliar with the constitutional and procedural requirements with 
which the trial court was required to comply in the course of 
determining a valid waiver. Requirements that are of momentous 
constitutional concern. To not consider and correct this matter on 
appeal would result in a great and manifest injustice or harm by 
failing to protect the constitutional right invalidly waived by 
Defendant, a pro se litigant, as a result of the trial court's 
failures. 
In the instant case, during an in-chambers discussion initiated 
by Defendant after jury selection, Defendant complained to the trial 
court about the lack of preparation by trial counsel. After 
Defendant complained about trial counsel's lack of preparation, the 
following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: I don't know what more preparation you 
would make, Mr. McDonald. Are you going to testify? 
MR. MCDONALD: Yes, sir. 
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THE COURT: Well, then, you have a right to go over 
that and there is plenty of time to do that [sic] 
MR. McDONALD: Do I have the right to go question, 
myself, the people that he puts on the stand? 
THE COURT: You can act as your own attorney if you 
want to. 
MR. McDONALD: Okay [sic] 
MR. ALBRIGHT: I would be happy to sit there and 
advise him throughout the trial, your Honor, if he 
prefers to represent himself. 
THE COURT: Do you prefer to represent yourself? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I will allow you to do that and make your 
questioning. You need to understand, however, that 
you will be required to abide by the same rules of 
evidence as any attorney would be. Have you been to 
court before? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: How many times have you been in court 
before? Have you been through a trial? 
MR. McDONALD: I have seen a trial before, yes, I 
have. 
THE COURT: Have you personally been involved in one? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have you been there when questions were 
asked and responses were given? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You have some knowledge then of the rules 
of evidence? 
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MR, MCDONALD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you know what's required in that 
regard? 
MR. MCDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: You realize that this is a serious case 
and that the evidence that would be presented is going 
to be critical in this matter? 
MR. MCDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Knowing that, is it still your desire to 
proceed and act as your own attorney? 
MR. MCDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: How much education have you had, Mr. 
McDonald? 
MR. McDONALD: I graduated, your Honor. 
THE COURT: From what? 
MR. McDONALD: From high school. 
THE COURT: Have you had any college experience? 
MR. McDONALD: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you read, write and understand the 
English language? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you appear to be very articulate, is 
that true? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Well, you have a right to act as your own 
attorney, but I will ask Mr. Albright to be here. 
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MR. MCDONALD: Yes, I would like for him to be there. 
THE COURT: Would you like him to make your opening 
argument for you? 
MR. MCDONALD: Yes, sir. 
(R. 96-98, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume I)). 
As evidenced by the aforementioned exchange, the trial court 
failed to sufficiently question Defendant so as to make him aware of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. By so doing, 
the trial court failed to make clear on the record that Defendant was 
fully aware of the hazards that he faced and the disadvantages of 
self-representation. 
Utilizing the sixteen points set forth by the Utah Supreme Court 
as a guideline for determining the validity of a waiver, the trial 
court (1) failed to inquire of Defendant as to whether he understood 
the crimes with which he had been charged and the possible sentences 
that could be imposed in the event that he was found guilty (see 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12 (points (c) , (d) , and (e) in 
footnote 12) ; (2) failed to inform Defendant that if he chose to 
represent himself, he would be on his own, and that the court would 
not assist or advise him of how to try his case (Id. point (f) in 
footnote 12) ; (3) failed to inquire as to whether Defendant was 
familiar with the Rule of Criminal Procedure, and that "those rules 
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govern the way in which a criminal action is tried in . . . court" 
(Id. (points (i) and (j) in footnote 12); (4) failed to inform 
Defendant that if he took the witness stand, he would have to his own 
testimony by asking questions of himself, and that he could not "just 
take the stand and tell" his story" (Id. (point (k) of footnote 12) ; 
and (5) failed to advise Defendant that, in the trial court's 
opinion, Defendant "would be far better defended by a trained 
lawyer", and that it would be unwise for Defendant to attempt self-
representation because he is not familiar with the law, court 
procedure, or the rules of evidence (Id. (point (1) of footnote 12) ; 
(6) failed to "strongly urge" that Defendant not try to represent 
himself (Id. (point (1) of footnote 12); and (7) failed to inquire 
whether Defendant's decision to represent himself, in light of the 
penalties that might be suffered if found guilty, was "entirely 
voluntary" (Id. (points (m) and (n) of footnote 12). By failing to 
inquire as to the aforementioned points as a guideline for 
determining waiver, the trial court breached its "duty" to determine 
if Defendant's waiver was "a voluntary one which [was] knowingly and 
intelligently made." Id. at 187; accord State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 
724, 731 (Utah App. 1991) (stating that "trial courts have an 
affirmative duty to determine that a defendant who chooses self-
representation does so knowingly and intelligently"). 
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In the instant case, the trial court's questions focused, almost 
exclusively, on Defendant's background (R. 96-98, Jury Trial 
Transcript (Volume I) ) . "The fact that a defendant is well educated, 
can read, or has been on trial previously is not dispositive as to 
whether he understood the relative advantages or disadvantages of 
self-representation in a particular situation." Frampton, 737 P.2d 
at 188 (quoting City of Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 Wash.2d 203, 211, 691 
P.2d 957, 962 (1984) (en banc)). To establish a valid waiver, it is 
incumbent upon the trial court to show on the record "that the 
defendant understood the seriousness of the charges and knew the 
possible maximum penalty. The record should also show that the 
defendant was aware of the existence of technical rules and that 
presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's story." 
Id. (emphasis added). The record indicates that the trial court 
failed to establish that Defendant understood the seriousness of the 
charges and knew the possible criminal penalties and enhancements4 
that could be imposed upon him by way of sentencing. While it is 
true that Defendant had some knowledge about the criminal penalties 
that could be imposed, (R. 96, lines 8-10, Transcript of Jury Trial 
(Volume I)), Defendant was in no way understood or was aware of the 
full gambit of the penalties and enhancements that could be imposed 
4See R. 505, lines 4-12, Sentencing Transcript. 
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in the event that he was found guilty, of which the trial court had 
a duty to advise Defendant. Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188 (quoting City 
of Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 Wash.2d 203, 211, 691 P.2d 957, 962 (1984) 
(en banc)). Because the trial court basically focused on the 
background of Defendant in determining whether there was a valid 
waiver,5 the trial court utilized the wrong standard to determine a 
waiver of the constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Whether 
the trial court utilized the proper legal standard in reaching its 
decision as to a valid waiver is a question of law, which is reviewed 
for correction of error. See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah App.), rev'd in part and aff'd in 
part, 862 P.2d 1354 (1993); State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 
(Utah 1993); Cf. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940-41 (Utah 1994) 
5The trial court's apparent focus on Defendant's background, to 
the exclusion of the other Frampton points, is especially troubling 
in light of the following exchange between Defendant and the trial 
court during the Pretrial Hearing in the instant case: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Mr. McDonald had a question for the 
Court. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I would like to know what kind of 
law am I standing in. Is this a constitutional right 
or what is this, just a Maritime law or what? 
THE COURT: It has nothing to do with Maritime laws. 
You are under the laws of the State of Utah which are 
statute in nature and guaranteed by both the 
Constitution of this State and the United States. 
MR. McDONALD: All right. 
(R. 55-56, Transcript of Pretrial Hearing). 
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(whether a defendant validly waived his or her Miranda rights is a 
question of law reviewed for correct of error); State v. Richardson, 
843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992) (trial court's interpretation of 
binding case law presents question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270-71 & n.ll (Utah 
1993) (trial court's determination of whether consent to search is 
voluntary is question of law that is reviewed for correction of 
error); State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1993) (ultimate legal 
determination of whether a confession is voluntary is conclusion of 
law, which is reviewed for correctness). 
In State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874 (Utah 1981), after the defendant 
choose to represent himself, the trial court briefly explained to the 
defendant the procedure to be followed for the balance of the trial. 
Id. at 875. In the course of reversing the trial court's 
determination of waiver and remanding for a new trial, the Utah 
Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court Mid not discuss with 
the defendant the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 
[The trial court] did not advise the defendant that it is generally 
advisable to have a lawyer who is skilled and trained in the law, and 
[it] did not point out to the defendant any of the hazards he may 
encounter by acting pro se." Id. at 876; Cf. Drobel, 815 P. 2d at 
730, 732 (affirminq trial court's determination of waiver due to the 
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record wherein trial court's "careful colloquys" with the defendant 
followed the points set forth in Frampton "in essence if not 
verbatim"); and State v. Dominquez, 564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977) 
(affirming the defendant's waiver of the right to the assistance of 
counsel in light of the defendant's being fully advised of the 
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without the aid of an 
attorney and the trial court's meticulous questioning of the 
defendant). 
Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court failed to 
discuss with Defendant the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. In addition, the trial court, in contravention to 
the recommended guidelines set forth in Frampton, did not advise 
Defendant that it is generally advisable to have a lawyer who is 
skilled and trained in the law. Finally, the trial court did not 
point out to Defendant any of the hazards he may encounter by acting 
pro se. 
Because the trial court, among other things, failed to discuss 
with Defendant the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, 
an appellate court is unable to assess whether Defendant validly 
waived his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. See 
State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d at 1355 (citing Bakalov, 849 P.2d at 637); 
see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 
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950 n.8 (1984) ("Since the right of self-representation is a right 
that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial 
outcome unfavorable to the defendant, it s denial is not amenable to 
"harmless error" analysis. The right is either respected denied; its 
deprivation cannot be harmless"). In light of the fundamental 
constitutional right involved and the inadequate colloquy by the 
trial counsel as to the waiver of that right, the only fair way to 
proceed is to vacate Defendant's conviction and remand the matter for 
retrial. Cf. State v. Rameriz, 817 P.2d 774, 789 (Utah 1991). 
2 . THE TRIAL COURT, BY APPOINTING FORMER TRIAL COUNSEL AS 
STANDBY COUNSEL TO ASSIST DEFENDANT IN HIS SELF-
REPRESENTATION, FAILED TO PRESERVE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION AND VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SELF-
REPRESENTATION . 
The United States Supreme Court, in Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975), noted that the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which gives criminal defendants the means 
to put on a defense, impliedly guarantees the right of a competent 
accused to represent himself, without counsel, in criminal 
proceedings. Id. at 818-19, 95 S.Ct. at 2533/ see also State v. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). The accused's right to 
conduct his own defense "must be respected and guarded by the courts 
in harmony with the right to assistance of counsel, also guaranteed 
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by the sixth amendment." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187 (emphasis added) . 
As part of that right, the United States Supreme Court, in Faretta, 
recognized that a trial court "may -- even over objection by the 
accused -- appoint a "standby counsel" to aid the accused if and when 
the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the 
accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-
representation is necessary." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, 95 
S.Ct. at 2541 n.4&; see also Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12 
(quoting Bench Book for the United States District Court Judges, 
which, as part of the guidelines for the colloquy concerning waiver 
of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, the trial 
court "should consider the appointment of standby counsel to assist 
the defendant and to replace him if the court should determine during 
trial that the defendant can no longer be permitted to represent 
himself"); and State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993) 
(urging the trial court, upon remand, "to appoint standby counsel to 
preserve [the defendant's] right to self-representation and to 
preclude subsequent claims of lack of waiver or ineffective 
assistance of counsel." 
Like the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel, the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation can be 
violated, per se, by an actual conflict of interest between standby 
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counsel and the client. See and cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067 (1984) (actual conflict of 
interest can result in per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel) . 
A Sixth Amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest, like 
that in the instant case, should be analyzed in the same fashion as 
a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
conflict of interest inasmuch as both involve fundamental 
constitutional rights. The effective performance of standby counsel, 
like that of other cases concerning effective representation, 
"requires the duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest." United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370 (4th Cir. 1991). A 
defendant that does not object to the conflict of interest at trial 
"has the burden on appeal of demonstrating with specificity that uSan 
actual conflict of interest existed which adversely affected his [or 
her] lawyer's performance.'" State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 
App. 1990) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S. Ct. 
1708, 1718 (1980)) . If such a showing is made, prejudice need not be 
demonstrated to prevail on this claim. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 
484, 488 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 
S.Ct. at 1718-19). In Tatum, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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stated the following as to the existence of an actual conflict of 
interest: 
An attorney has an actual conflict of interest 
when he actively represents conflicting 
interests . . . . When the attorney is actively 
engaged in legal representation which requires 
him to account to two masters, an actual 
conflict exists when it can be shown that he 
took action on behalf of one. The effect of his 
action of necessity will adversely affect the 
appropriate defense of the other. Moreover, an 
adverse effect may not always be revealed from a 
review of the affirmative actions taken. 
Rather, the failure to take actions that are 
clearly suggested from the circumstances can be 
as revealing. 
Tatum, 943 F.2d at 375-76. 
The prevailing professional and ethical standards are applicable 
to the instant case. Rule 1.7(b), Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, states in relevant part: "A lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation of that client may be materially limited 
by . . . the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) The lawyer reasonably 
believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) 
Each client consents after consultation." Utah Rule of Professional 
Conduct 8.4(d) addresses the institutional interest in ensuring that 
just verdicts are rendered in criminal cases --an interest that may 
be jeopardized by the existence of conflicts of interest. Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988). 
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At the point the risk of a conflict of interest is brought to 
the trial court's attention, "the court has the responsibility to 
investigate further, to advise the defendant personally, and to 
receive a knowing waiver if that is the expressed wish of the 
defendant." Id. at 379. "Upon the trial court rests the duty of 
seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential 
rights of the accused . . . ." Hollaway v. Arkansas, 43 5 U.S. 4 75, 
484, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 (1978) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 
315 U.S. 60, 71, 62 S.Ct. 457, 465 (1942)). In Wood v. Georgia, 450 
U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held 
that a conflict situation which is not addressed by the trial court 
requires reversal: "Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court 
has failed to make an inquiry even though it "knows or reasonably 
should know that a particular conflict exists.'" Id. at 272 n.18, 
101 S.Ct. at 1104 n.18 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cuyler, 446 
U.S. at 347, 100 S.Ct. at 1717). Similarly, when a conflict 
situation becomes apparent to the State, it "has a duty to bring the 
issue to the court's attention and, if necessary, move for 
disqualification of counsel." latum, 943 F.2d at 379-80; Cf. United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 (1976). 
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The conflict of interest issue was arguably raised to the trial 
court in the course of the in-chambers conference initiated by 
Defendant, in which Defendant vigorously complained about trial 
counsel's lack of preparation of Defendant for trial (R. 93-101, Jury 
Trial Transcript (Volume I)). However, to the extent that it might 
not have been raised to the trial court, the plain error and/or 
exceptional circumstances analysis previously cited in the foregoing 
argument on the waiver of the constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel is applicable. Therefore, this Court should address the 
conflict of interest issue due to both the fundamental constitutional 
right involved and the exceptional circumstances involving a pro se 
litigant who was unaware of the consequences of such a conflict of 
interest on his right to self-representation. 
In the instant case, the trial court, after an extensive in-
chambers discussion concerning Defendant's vigorous complaint about 
trial counsel's lack of preparation, appointed trial counsel as 
standby counsel to assist defendant in the course of his self-
representation (R. 101-102, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume I)). 
During the previously mentioned in-chambers conference, it was 
obvious that a conflict of interest existed between trial counsel and 
Defendant (See R. 94, Jury Trial Transcript, (Volume I), where trial 
counsel states that Defendant's complaint about preparation "puts me 
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in an awkward situation, because I am here to represent him.") 
Further, the trial court, while in chambers, subsequently made 
findings on the record concerning the dispute between trial counsel 
and Defendant as to trial counsel's preparation for trial (R. 101, 
lines 12-23, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume I)). Finally, the 
prosecutor, who was also present during the in-chambers conference, 
made representations to the court that trial counsel was in fact 
prepared for trial (R. 101, lines 1-11, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume 
D) . 
At the point the conflict of interest was brought to the trial 
court's attention, it had the responsibility to investigate further, 
to advise Defendant personally, and to obtain a knowing waiver of the 
conflict before appointing trial counsel as standby counsel to assist 
Defendant during the course of the jury trial. See Tatum, 943 F.2d 
at 379. As a result of these failures, the trial court breached the 
duty it had to preserve Defendant's right to self-representation, 
especially in light of the expectation of reliance on standby counsel 
created by the trial court by its appointment of trial counsel to 
assist Defendant during the jury trial. 
As a result of the in-chambers dispute as to whether trial 
counsel adequately prepared for trial, there arose substantial 
questions about the existence of a conflict of interest. Here, trial 
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counsel, as standby counsel, harbored substantial personal interests 
involving potential interests to avoid discipline by way of a 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that conflicted with the 
clear objective and ethical responsibility of representation as 
standby counsel. Trial counsel's involvement in this capacity 
required him to account to two masters with conflicting interests, 
not to mention any personal reservations that might have existed due 
to the dispute concerning preparation for trial. The record in the 
instant case is completely devoid of any indication that trial 
counsel assisted Defendant as standby counsel during the course of 
the jury trial (R. 60-500, Jury Trial Transcript (Volumes I and II)). 
In fact, just prior to Closing Arguments, former trial counsel, as 
standby counsel, asked that he be excused inasmuch as he felt that 
Defendant would not need legal advice for Closing Arguments (R. 462, 
Jury Trial Transcript (Volume II)), which request the trial court 
denied. Consequently, an actual conflict of interest existed and 
Defendant need not show prejudice to prevail. See Johnson, 823 P.2d 
at 488 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the failure of the trial court to 
address the surrounding circumstances of the conflict of interest 
situation requires reversal inasmuch as the trial court knew or 
reasonably should have known of the particular conflict of interest 
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between Defendant and trial counsel. Wood, 450 U.S. at 272 n. 18, 
101 S.Ct. at 1104 n.18 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347, 100 S. Ct. at 
1717) . Additionally, the State failed in its duty to bring the 
conflict of interest issue to the trial court's attention. See 
Tatum, 943 F.2d at 379-80; Cf. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11, 96 S.Ct. at 
2401. 
CONCISION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that the 
Court reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial so 
that Defendant might be receive, among other things, proper advise as 
to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation for a valid 
waiver and, if Defendant chooses to represent himself, so that the 
conflict of interest issue can be adequately addressed and resolved 
to preserve Defendant's right to self-representation. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD QF DIgPQSITIQN 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to 
the assistance of counsel and the valid waiver of such, which is a 
matter of continuing public interest and involves issues requiring 
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further development in the area of criminal law. Counsel for 
Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the 
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official 
Publication" for purposes of precedential value in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ifclfl day of January, 1996. 
!GREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
WULktw at Wigc 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
NONE 
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